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Stephen K. Underwood, Esq. 
1395 Union Road 
West Seneca, NY 14224 
06-038-19 B 
May 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months. 
Coppola, Crangle 
Appellant's Brief received October 3, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's.Findings and Recommendation 
Records·. relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transeript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Forin 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
. . 
Final-B.ete~rmination- The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: . 
// t/~ - ' . 
{_~ ~rmed _· _ . Vacat~d, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to---~ 
~ission~r 
~ _ Vaca.ted, remanded for de novo interview _ . Modified to _ _ _ _ 
_ . _ Vacated.' remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
If!be Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Boar~'s determination must be ann~xed hereto. · · 
'~~d<'~\~,,'Ffli~Fltrat~Jif.eieffiimatjorl;~hs5t~ J!~S,fa~ik~P~~J.JQ.it]J:in,dings ·and the~separ~te·findin ; ·of 
: the Parole Board, i f'an~~nrailed to the Inmate arid the Ii:imate" s Counsel, if any, on J 13 'di>d-o . r;--. . 
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File · 
P-2002(B). (1 1/2018) 
.',·· 
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Appellant challenges the May 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
a 24-month hold. The instant offense involved Appellant sexually abusing his stepdaughters over 
an extended period of time while married to their mother. One victim was abused between the ages 
of 5 and 12 years old. As a result of the abuse, she became pregnant and gave birth to a child. The 
second victim was abused between the ages of 9 and 11 years old. Appellant raises the following 
issues: 1) the Board failed to release Appellant despite the fact the COMPAS found him to be an 
overall low risk; 2) a proper Transitional Accountability Plan (“TAP”) was not developed for 
Appellant; 3) the decision was arbitrary and capricious because the determination was based on 
the severity of the instant offenses and Appellant’s disciplinary record without any showing of 
aggravating circumstances; 4) the decision was conclusory, lacked detailed analysis, and failed to 
state the reasons for the denial in sufficient detail; 5) Appellant was denied release for the same 
reasons set forth by the panel on prior appearances; 6) the Board failed to consider all statutory 
factors and the mitigating factors of Appellant’s crimes; 7) the denial is tantamount to the Board 
resentencing Appellant; and 8) Appellant was denied due process because the Board failed to 
prepare a record of its deliberations. These arguments are without merit. 
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for 
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).  
 
While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 
2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The 
Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of 
Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).  In the absence 
of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be 
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presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 
680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 
A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 
157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 
128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
 
The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the 
appropriate factors, including: the instant offense of Predatory Sexual Assault Against a Child and 
Course of Sexual Conduct Against a Child in the first degree; Appellant’s criminal history of prior 
unlawful behavior; ; and Appellant’s institutional efforts including 
poor disciplinary record, completion of the sex offender treatment program, enrollment in , 
vocational programming, and work in the law library. The Board also had before it and considered, 
among other things, the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, the sentencing minutes, and a letter 
from the District Attorney, and a letter of support. 
 
After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release 
would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its 
conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offense representing a serious escalation of 
criminal conduct, the serious emotional and physical harm Appellant caused two defenseless 
children, and Appellant’s lack of credibility and insight as to why he committed the acts. See Matter 
of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d 
Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012); Matter of Symmonds v. Dennison, 
21 A.D.3d 1171, 1172, 801 N.Y.S.2d 90, 90 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 6 N.Y.3d 701, 810 N.Y.S.2d 
415 (2005); Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 
N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 
235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997); Matter of Karlin v. Cully, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 
1286, 960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013); Matter of Wellman v. Dennison, 23 A.D.3d 974, 
975, 805 N.Y.S.2d 159, 160 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Bockeno v. New York State Parole Bd., 
227 A.D.2d 751, 642 N.Y.S.2d 97 (3d Dept. 1996); Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 
478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000); Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 
996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 
N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 
1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901 (2017). The Board also cited 
the COMPAS instrument’s elevated scores for reentry substance abuse, prison misconduct and 
low family support. See Matter of Espinal v. N.Y. State Bd. Of Parole, 172 A.D.3d 1816, 100 
N.Y.S.3d 777 (3d Dept. 2019); Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 
(3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017). 
While the Board does not agree that aggravating factors are always necessary to support reliance on 
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an inmate’s crime, Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, here Appellant’s 
callous and deviant behavior over a prolonged period of time, specifically cited by the Board, serves 
as such an egregious circumstance and the Board’s decision was nonetheless based on the additional 
consideration of Appellant’s lack of insight. 
 
Appellant’s contention that the Board failed to release Appellant despite the fact the COMPAS 
found him to be an overall low risk is without merit. The 2011 amendments require procedures 
incorporating risk and needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  
Executive Law § 259–c(4).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS 
instrument.  Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 
2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 
(3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 
N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 
386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  This is encompassed in the Board’s regulations.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 
8002.2(a).   However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole 
indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, 
including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate 
the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the 
statutory factors including the instant offense.  The amendments also did not change the three 
substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole.  
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter 
of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is 
an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the 
purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State 
Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes 
v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  That is exactly what occurred here. 
We also note that the Board does not determine COMPAS scores and an administrative appeal to the 
Board is not the proper forum to challenge the COMPAS instrument. 
 
As for the TAP, the name of the Transitional Accountability Plan was changed to “Offender 
Case Plan.”  The existing regulations already refer to and require consideration of the “case plan.”  
9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(b).  Accordingly, no further regulation is required.  An Offender Case Plan 
was prepared for Appellant and made available to the Board at the time of the interview. 
 
The Board’s decision also satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
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v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
 
Appellant objects to the fact that the Board decision is based on the same reasons given after 
his last appearance before the Board.  However, as the Board is required to consider the same 
statutory factors each time an inmate appears, it follows that the Board may deny release on the 
same grounds as relied upon in previous determinations.  Matter of Hakim v. Travis, 302 A.D.2d 
821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept. 2003); see also Matter of Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 
110, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1st Dept.), aff'd, 11 N.Y.3d 777, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602 (2008). 
 
Inasmuch as Appellant contends the Board failed to consider requisite factors, there is a 
presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders.  See 
People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People 
ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d 
Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in 
fulfilling its obligations.  See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000).   
 
The Board did not err in rejecting Appellant’s attempt to mitigate the severity of the crime by 
claiming that he had been drinking alcohol  – claims 
that were rejected by the jury.  Matter of Morel v. Travis, 278 A.D.2d 580, 581, 717 N.Y.S.2d 425, 
426 (3d Dept. 2000); see also Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476-77, 718 N.Y.S.2d 
704, 707-708 (2000). 
 
Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
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Finally, Appellant’s contention that he was denied due process because the Board failed to 
prepare a record of its deliberations is without merit. An inmate has no Constitutional right to be 
conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of 
Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo 
v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 
737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The New York State parole scheme “holds out no more 
than a possibility of parole” and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the 
due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. 
Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 
A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). We nonetheless note that the Board is not 
required to record its internal deliberations or discussions.  Matter of Barnes v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 53 A.D.3d 1012, 862 N.Y.S.2d 639 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of Borcsok v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 34 A.D.3d 961, 823 N.Y.S.2d 310 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Collins 
v. Hammock, 96 A.D.2d 733, 465 N.Y.S.2d 84 (4th Dept. 1983). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
